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1 Introduction 
This paper provides new evidence on the effects of overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
the skill-mix and industrial structure of multinational firms’ home-country operations. 
Understanding the adjustment mechanisms of multinational firms is important in the context of 
the relaxation of barriers to inward investment in low-wage economies, such as China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001. The OECD (2006) highlights China as a major destination for 
FDI outside the OECD area, with estimated inflows of $72 billion in 2005. How multinational 
firms structure their operations globally is also of considerable interest as they make up a 
substantial proportion of employment in OECD economies. Bernard and Jensen (2007) report 
that US multinationals account for 26% of manufacturing employment in the US; in Great 
Britain in 2001 UK-owned multinationals accounted for 20% of manufacturing employment and 
foreign-owned multinationals a further 25% (Griffith et al., 2004). International restructuring 
can potentially affect large numbers, and particular groups of workers, and is of considerable 
interest to governments concerned with income inequality. The paper contributes to the debate 
on off-shoring jobs - whether overseas employment displaces domestic employment, and 
assesses whether there are asymmetric effects on low and high-skilled workers. 
The paper focuses on vertical FDI and on plant exit, since plant closures and cross-border 
relocation are important adjustment margins for multinational firms. An innovative feature is 
that I exploit within-firm, plant-level information on firms’ organisational and industrial 
structure in combination with firm-level information on the geographic composition of their 
overseas investment activity. Compared to the existing literature, the plant-level data allow me 
to provide novel evidence on within-firm adjustment in the industrial (or product) mix of home-
country activity. In addition, to aid identification of the effects of overseas investment I exploit 
an exogenous policy change in the form of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which eased 
restrictions on inward FDI. I adapt the model of Helpman et al. (2004) to demonstrate how this 
policy reform might induce some firms to begin investing in China, and how this in turn might 
have asymmetric effects on their high-skill and low-skill activities at home. I use this model to 
motivate my instrumental variables estimation strategy. Finally, the paper provides new micro-
level evidence on the home-country effects of outward investment for the UK, a highly open and 
relatively de-regulated economy. 
The question I investigate comes directly from the theory of vertical FDI. I examine whether 
investment abroad in relatively low-wage economies is associated with plant closures in 
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relatively low-skill, labour-intensive industries at home. That is, I look for evidence in line with 
low-skill-intensive production being relocated to low-wage economies. To do this I make 
comparisons across industries and across firms akin to a difference-in-differences analysis. I 
demonstrate that plants in low-skill industries in the UK that are owned by multinationals 
investing in low-wage economies are more likely to be shut down compared to (1), plants in the 
same industry owned by firms that are not investing in low-wage economies, and (2), plants in 
high-skill industries owned by the same group of firms. The paper confirms that low-skill 
workers are those most likely to be adversely affected by their employers investing overseas in 
low-wage economies, and shows that plant closure is an important adjustment margin. 
Moreover, the results point towards potential beneficial effects for workers in high-skill 
industries within the same firms, where overseas investment in low-wage economies may 
increase the likelihood of plant survival.   
Figure 1. Probability of plant exit by industry skill-intensity and firm ownership type 
 
Note: Skill-intensity is measured using the proportion of employees in a 4-digit industry with no qualifications. 
Low and high skill-intensity sectors are the top and bottom third of industries ranked on this measure. Figure based 
on the population of manufacturing plants present in 1998. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) to identify plant exit and 
ownership type. Industry skill-intensity derived from the UK Labour Force Survey. 
 
Figure 1 presents some first-pass evidence from the raw data that, within low-skill industries, 
plants owned by UK multinationals (UK-MNEs) investing in low-wage economies have a 
higher propensity to exit than those owned by other firms. For each group of industries the 
figure shows the unconditional probability of exit for four different types of plants: domestic-
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owned; plants owned by a foreign-owned multinational; plants owned by UK-MNEs that are 
investing in low-wage economies; and plants owned by UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-
wage economies. This is based on the cohort of plants active in the UK manufacturing sector in 
1998, and plants are categorised on the basis of their characteristics in that year. The left panel 
shows the relatively high probability of exit among plants in low-skill-intensity industries 
owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies (UK-MNE low wage). To demonstrate 
that this is not simply the result of a general higher propensity to exit among plants owned by 
this type of firm across all industries, the right panel shows exit propensities among plants in 
high-skill industries. Here there is no marked difference. My econometric analysis explores 
these relationships in more detail. 
The paper extends and combines two strands of the literature. First, research on the home-
country effects of outward investment such as Head and Ries (2002), which finds that 
investment in relatively low-wage economies is associated with an increase in the skill-intensity 
of firms’ home activities as predicted by the theory of vertical FDI. Harrison and MacMillan 
(2007) investigate the effects of outward investment on home-country activity using data on US 
multinationals and find that for vertical multinationals foreign and domestic (US) employment 
are complements. Muendler and Becker (2008) examine how multinational employment 
responds to international wage differentials at both the intensive margin (within existing firms at 
home and affiliates abroad) and the extensive margin (by establishing new facilities abroad). 
Overall they find home and overseas employment to be substitutes. They find that a wage 
increase in the home economy (Germany) is associated with an increase in employment in 
developing countries at the extensive margin. They find no evidence that an increase in wages in 
developing countries has a significant effect on home-country employment, but an increase in 
wages in Central and Eastern European countries is found to have a positive effect.1  
In this paper I emphasise that whether overseas and domestic employment are complements or 
substitutes may depend on both the location of overseas investment and the characteristics of 
employment in the home economy. I investigate heterogeneous effects within firms’ activities; 
whether FDI in low-wage economies in fact substitutes for a particular type of home-country 
labour, that in low-skill industries, and whether there is any evidence that it is a complement for 
home-country employment in high-skill industries. While the papers discussed above use data 
                                                 
1 Further research in this area includes Brainard and Riker (1997), Riker and Brainard (1997), Braconier and 
Ekholm (2000) and Desai et al. (2007). Chapter 9 of Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004) provides a summary of 
research on home-country effects of outward FDI. Yeaple (2003a) provides an industry-level analysis which finds a 
role for comparative advantage in explaining the pattern of U.S. outward FDI. 
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on multinationals’ home-country activities at the firm level, I use plant-level data allowing me to 
observe plant closures within firms across industries of varying skill-intensity. This enables me 
to investigate how any increase in the skill-intensity of production at the firm-level comes about, 
and to analyse within-firm industrial restructuring that is directly related to the theoretical 
predictions of models in which multinationals locate different activities geographically 
according to comparative advantage.  
Secondly, because of the focus on closures, the research also contributes to the literature on 
plant exit, multinational firms and organisational structure such as Bernard and Jensen (2007), 
which finds that plants owned by multinational firms are significantly more likely to exit than 
purely domestic plants once their superior performance characteristics are accounted for.2 I 
extend their findings by demonstrating that the pattern of multinational plant exit across 
different industries or products is linked to the location of outward investment. 
The paper also relates to the literature on global outsourcing - the decision to contract with an 
overseas producer rather than produce abroad in-house (Antràs, 2003 and Antràs and Helpman, 
2004). Hijzen et al. (2005) conduct an industry-level analysis of the effects of international 
outsourcing and find a negative impact on the demand for unskilled labour in the UK, (Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1996, 1999 provide evidence for the US). Although I am unable to observe 
international outsourcing in my data, I discuss the implications of this alternative form of 
offshore production for my results.3 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical background, the 
main hypothesis to be examined and my econometric approach. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 details the results, including the results of the 
instrumental variables estimation and a series of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Outward FDI and within firm adjustment 
The literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs) differentiates between horizontal FDI, the 
replication of home-country activity abroad in proximity to customers as a substitute for 
exporting, and vertical FDI, locating different stages of the production chain, or for multi-
                                                 
2 Disney et al. (2003b) using UK data find that, without conditioning on other characteristics, stand-alone 
establishments are more likely to exit than establishments that are part of larger groups. 
3 This paper is also related to the literature on the effects of import competition on plant performance. Bernard, 
Jensen and Schott (2006) show that import competition from low-wage economies is associated with an increased 
probability of plant death, decreasing employment and industry switching into more capital-intensive sectors. 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006) also emphasise the importance of product switching in output growth. 
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product firms locating the production of different goods, geographically according to countries’ 
comparative advantage.4 In practice MNEs may undertake both types of overseas investment 
simultaneously, however horizontal and vertical FDI have different implications for the skill-
intensity of an MNE’s home-country operations. The key difference is that while horizontal FDI 
could imply an increase in the skill-intensity of production at home (either through the 
manufacture of low-skill-intensity products abroad that would otherwise have been produced at 
home and exported, or through the expansion of headquarter or R&D services at home), this 
would be expected to occur irrespective of the economic characteristics of the host economy. 
Whereas, if firms are engaging in vertical FDI effects on home-country operations would be 
expected to be systematically related to the economic characteristics of host economies relative 
to those of the home country. 
Under vertical FDI firms would be expected to locate (low) skill-intensive activities in (low) 
skill-abundant countries. Hence the relocation of activity to a relatively low-skill-abundant, low-
wage country would be expected to be associated with an increase in the skill-intensity of 
production at home. What is pertinent for my analysis is how the theory predicts this 
relationship comes about. Vertical FDI concerns locating specific activities within the firm 
according to countries’ comparative advantage. Hence it is appropriate to use within-firm data to 
ascertain whether investment in low-wage economies is associated with a decrease in the extent 
to which MNEs carry out relatively low-skill activities at home.5 
In the next section I illustrate the heterogeneous effects of investment in low-wage economies 
using a partial equilibrium model based on that in Helpman et al. (2004), which considered a 
firm’s choice between exporting and FDI as substitute methods of serving an overseas market. 
Here I consider a similar choice between home versus overseas production as substitute 
locations from which to serve a world market. I use this model to motivate my empirical 
strategy which I discuss in section 2.2. 
2.1 Domestic versus overseas production of low-skill and high-skill intensive goods  
Suppose there are two countries D (domestic) and F (foreign), and two sectors (L) and (H), 
which each produce differentiated products. Sector L uses low-skill labour in production and 
                                                 
4 Models of horizontal multinationals are Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997) and of vertical multinationals, 
Helpman (1984, 1985); Venables (1999) and Yeaple (2003b) contain elements of both types of activity. 
5 See Hanson et al. (2005) for an analysis of within-firm trade and vertical production networks which exploits 
variation across affiliates operating in the same industry in different locations owned by the same firm. 
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sector H uses high-skill labour. Country D is relatively high-skill labour abundant, while 
country F is low-skill labour abundant. Labour is immobile. 
Production of low-skill-intensive goods 
I assume that wage rates are such that wages of low-skilled workers in country D, LDw , are higher 
than wages of low-skilled workers in country F, LFw , i.e. 
L
D
L
F ww <           (1) 
To enter sector L a firm pays a fixed entry cost .EG
6 It then draws a labour per unit of output 
coefficient ϕ . On observing this it decides either, i) not to start production, ii) to produce in 
country D and pay a fixed cost , or iii) to produce in country F and pay a fixed cost , 
where:  
DG FG
DG < ,           (2) FG
reflecting additional costs incurred in setting up a production facility overseas, (overcoming 
language and legal barriers etc). 
Market structure is such that firms engage in monopolistic competition. Preferences across 
varieties of goods in sector L take a CES form, with elasticity of substitution 1)1/(1 >−= αε . 
Demand is given by for each variety where A is exogenous for each producer. ε−Ap
For given ϕ , prices of domestic, , and overseas, , produced goods are:  LDp LFp
αϕ /LDLD wp = ,         (3) αϕ /LFLF wp =
where α/1  is the mark-up over marginal cost. With demand function , revenues for a firm 
producing in the domestic economy, , and for a firm producing in the overseas economy, 
, are given by:  
ε−Ap
L
DR
L
FR
εαϕ −= 1)/( LDLD wAR ,        (4) εαϕ −= 1)/( LFLF wAR
and variable costs,  and , by:  LDC
L
FC
                                                 
6 With free entry ex-ante expected profits will equal the fixed entry cost . In Helpman et al. (2004), this 
condition, in conjunction with the conditions determining the productivity cut-off points for domestic production, 
exporting and FDI, provide solutions for the cut-off points and demand levels. 
EG
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εαϕα −= 1)/( LDLD wAC ,       (5) εαϕα −= 1)/( LFLF wAC
respectively. Therefore profits for a firm in country D are: 
D
L
D
L
D GwA −−= −εαϕαπ 1)/()1(  = ,     (6) DLLD GBw −−εϕ 1)(
and for a firm producing overseas in country F are:  
F
L
F
L
F GwA −−= −εαϕαπ 1)/()1( = ,     (7) FLLF GBw −−εϕ 1)(
where . εαα −−= 1/)1( AB L
The two profit functions are increasing and linear in . Since εϕ −1 1>ε , they are increasing in 
labour productivity )/1( ϕ . Figure 1 shows the two profit functions for production in countries D 
and F respectively, following the assumptions for wages and fixed costs in (1) and (2). The 
figure implies that firms with the lowest productivity exit, i.e. firms with productivity below the 
point where profits are zero ( ). Firms with productivity between  and  make 
positive profits and produce in country D, where is the level of productivity at which profits 
from producing domestically and producing abroad are equalised. Firms with productivity above 
make positive profits from producing abroad in country F. The cut-off points , and 
are given by the following: 
εϕ −10 εϕ −10 εϕ −1F
ϕ −10
εϕ −1F
εϕ −1F
εϕ −1F
ε
D
LL
D GBw =−− εεϕ 110 )(          (8) 
DF
L
F
L
D
L
F GGBww −=− −−− εεε ϕ 111 ])()[(       (9) 
Suppose that there is a reduction in the fixed cost of investing in country F to . Figure 2 
shows the new, lower productivity level  at which profits from producing abroad and 
producing domestically are equalised. There is a group of firms with productivity between 
and  for whom it is now more profitable to produce abroad – lower per unit of labour 
wage costs outweigh the higher fixed cost of investment. They would have an incentive to shut 
down domestic activity and shift production abroad. As a result the average productivity of the 
group of firms investing abroad decreases following the reduction in the fixed cost. 
2FG
εϕ −1
2'F
εϕ −1 2F εϕ −1F
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Figure 1. Domestic versus overseas production in the low-skill-intensive sector 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic versus overseas production in the low-skill-intensive sector, a reduction 
in the fixed cost of investment overseas 
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Production of high-skill-intensive goods 
Turning to the production of goods in the high-skill sector, I assume that wages of high-skilled 
workers in country D, , are no higher than wages of high-skilled workers in F, , i.e.: HDw
H
Fw
H
F
H
D ww ≤                     (10) 
Using equivalent expressions for profits from production in each of the two locations, together 
with the assumptions for wages and fixed costs given in (10) and (2), figure 3 illustrates the two 
profit functions  and . Again firms with productivity below , the zero profit cut-off, 
exit. However in this case since  and < , there is no productivity level at which 
it becomes more profitable to produce a high-skill-intensive good overseas, and a reduction in 
 to , such that < , implies no change to the location of production. 
H
Dπ HFπ
D G
εϕ −10
H
F
H
D ww < DG FG
FG 2FG G 2F
Figure 3. Domestic versus overseas production in the high-skill-intensive sector 
 
Therefore the model implies that a reduction in the fixed cost of investment in a relatively low-
skill-abundant economy is expected to result in the substitution of domestic for overseas 
production in low-skill-intensive industries, but not in high-skill-intensive industries. It also 
implies that not all firms will be equally affected by the reduction in the fixed cost – a particular 
group, in this case the most productive firms that are not currently investing in the low-skill-
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abundant economy, will be best placed to capitalise on the new overseas investment opportunity. 
Finally, although not illustrated above, for those firms that do switch production overseas and 
expand output and increase profits, there may be beneficial effects on their remaining 
complementary (high-skill) activities in the domestic economy, for example increased output 
and an increased likelihood of survival. In the next section I describe how I use this model to 
motivate my estimation strategy. 
2.2 Estimation approach 
I examine whether outward investment in relatively low-wage economies is associated with 
firms closing plants in relatively low-skill industries in the home-country economy. To do this I 
use panel data at the plant level from which I can identify exit, combined with information on 
the location of overseas investment at the firm level, where a firm encompasses one or more 
plants in the home country potentially operating across a range of industries. All estimation is 
carried out on plants operating in the UK. 
I begin by taking an approach akin to a difference-in-differences specification. For identification 
purposes the underlying assumption is that in the absence of vertical FDI behaviour, the 
propensity to close plants in low-skill-intensity industries relative to high-skill-intensity 
industries should be the same, both for firms that are investing in low-wage economies and for a 
control group of firms that are not, conditional on observable characteristics. I estimate a linear 
probability model of plant death given by: 
ptrtj
jitjitjit
itititptpt
rtInd
SIUKmneHSIUKmneLSIFO
UKmneHUKmneLFOXExit
ε
δδδ
γγγβα
++++
+++
++++=
*** 321
321
    (11) 
where p indicates plant, i firm, j industry, t time and r region.  is a one/zero indicator 
variable that takes the value one if plant p exits (is observed for the final time in the population) 
in period t. Xpt is a vector of plant characteristics which may be related to the propensity to exit. 
FOit, UKmneLit and UKmneHit are dummy variables indicating that in period t a plant is an 
affiliate of a foreign-owned MNE, is owned by a UK-MNE that is investing in a low-wage 
economy or is owned by a UK-MNE that is not investing in a low-wage economy, respectively.
ptExit
7 
The omitted category is plants that are part of firms that are not multinationals. Indj, are industry 
                                                 
7 Note that UK-MNEs defined as investing in low-wage economies may also be investing in high-wage economies. 
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dummies which will control for factors such as the degree of import competition facing firms in 
the industry and the industry-level propensity to outsource production,8 and tt, and rr are time 
and region dummies. I cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
The main parameter of interest is 2δ  on the interaction term between the UKmneLit indicator 
and SIj, which is a measure of the skill intensity of the industry j in which the plant operates. For 
plants owned by firms that are investing abroad in low-wage economies the propensity to exit is 
expected to be decreasing in the skill intensity of the industry. This relationship should be 
stronger compared to the comparison groups, i.e. compared to 1δ  and 3δ , the coefficients on the 
other interaction terms. If this is the case then firms investing in low-wage economies are 
significantly more likely to close down plants in low-skill industries relative to plants in high-
skill industries, than the three control groups of firms (those that are not part of MNEs, those 
that are affiliates of foreign-owned MNEs and those that are owned by UK-MNEs not investing 
in low-wage economies).9 The analysis is akin to a difference-in-differences specification 
because it compares the difference in the propensity to exit in high versus low-skill-intensity 
industries across plants owned by different types of firm. I also replace the interactions with SIj 
with interactions with dummy variables indicating in which third of the skill-intensity 
distribution an industry lies. This enables me to ascertain whether the results are driven by UK-
MNEs investing in low-wage economies having a higher propensity to close plants in low-skill-
intensity industries (rather than a lower propensity to close plants in high-skill sectors). 
The decision to invest in a low-wage economy is potentially endogenous. Endogeneity bias may 
occur since the decisions to invest abroad and to shut down plants at home are taken 
simultaneously, indeed the firm may invest in a low-wage economy in order to survive, and both 
decisions may be related to unobserved characteristics. To address this I exploit the time-series 
dimension of the data. First, I control for non-time-varying unobservable firm-level 
characteristics that may be correlated with overseas investment decisions by introducing firm-
fixed effects. Second, I estimate an instrumental variables specification using exogenous 
variation in the fixed cost of investing abroad to identify the effects of investment in low-wage 
                                                 
8 I do not observe whether firms outsource (low-skill-intensive) production abroad. If UK-MNEs with affiliates in 
low-wage countries also have a higher propensity to outsource low-skill production, then any estimated effect on 
the propensity to close UK plants in low-skill industries may be partly driven by outsourcing rather than off-shoring 
production in house. However, if these activities are substitutes and firms without affiliates in low-wage countries 
are more likely to be outsourcing low-skill production this may make it harder to identify the effect of interest. 
9 I am not able to determine whether the parents of foreign-owned affiliates in the UK are investing in low-wage 
economies. To the extent that they are, this may make it more difficult to detect a difference in exit behaviour 
compared to UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies. 
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economies on plant exit in domestic production. Using the structure of the model in section 2.1 a 
reduction in the fixed cost of establishing a plant overseas should only affect domestic exit 
through the overseas investment decision and not directly, hence can be a potentially valid 
instrument. More specifically, I use China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 as the 
exogenous change in entry conditions and investigate the impact of investment in China on 
domestic plant exit.10 
The decision to invest in China 
In the first stage of the estimation I characterise the decision to invest in China. This is estimated 
on data at the firm level. The decision to invest in China is expected to vary with the fixed costs 
of establishing a facility, which are assumed to fall after Chinese WTO accession. Moreover, the 
propensity to invest is expected to vary with firm characteristics. From the model in section 2.1 
the likelihood of investment should vary with productivity, but I also include measures of firm 
size and capital intensity and an indicator of whether a firm is already operating in other low-
wage economies in South and East Asia, which may affect the likelihood that the firm is able to 
capitalise on the lower fixed cost of investing in China.  
The estimation equation is given by (12) where  is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i 
invests in China in period t,  are firm characteristics,  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one in years post Chinese WTO accession (2002-2003),  are time dummies, 
and  and  are industry and region dummies. The post-accession dummy is interacted with 
the relevant firm characteristics to capture the heterogeneous impact of the reduction in the fixed 
cost of investing in China and to generate firm-level, time-series variation in the instrument. 
itC
itX tPostWTO
tt
jInd rr
))*(()1Pr( 1 rtjitttitit rtIndXPostWTOPostWTOXC +++++Φ== δγβ              (12) 
Since the endogenous variable in the final stage equation for plant exit, , is a dummy variable 
I follow Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 18, section 18.4) and estimate the first stage equation as a 
probit and obtain the predicted probability of investment in China, . This predicted 
probability is then used as an instrument in the final stage equation. 
itC
itCˆ
                                                 
10 The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures meant that China could no longer impose local 
content, trade balancing, and foreign exchange balancing requirements on foreign investments post-accession. 
Enforced technology transfer was also ruled out, and the distribution sector was liberalised leading to improved 
access for foreign producers (see Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). Aggregate FDI flows into China increased during 
2001-2004, against a background of decreasing world FDI flows (see Whalley and Xin, 2006). 
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The decision to shut down plants at home 
The estimation equation is given by  
ptirtjjititptpt rtIndSICCXExit εμδλβα ++++++++= *    (13) 
which is similar to equation (11) above, but now only distinguishes between plants owned by 
firms investing in China compared to those owned by all other firms. Equation (13) also 
includes firm fixed effects iμ , hence identification of the coefficient λ  will come through 
within-firm time-series variation.11 I instrument the two endogenous variables  and  
with  and , where  is derived from the first stage equation. As before the 
coefficient on the interaction term 
itC jit SIC *
itCˆ jit SIC *ˆ itCˆ
δ  is expected to indicate that for plants owned by firms 
investing in China, their propensity to exit is decreasing in the skill-intensity of the industry.12 
One issue in estimation is choosing the appropriate control group of firms. I present results 
using plants owned by all firms other than those investing in low-wage economies (or in China) 
as controls, and also just using UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-wage economies as 
controls. The latter may make a closer comparison group in terms of underlying characteristics, 
and Bernard and Jensen (2007) identify home-country multinationals in general as having a 
higher propensity to exit compared to purely domestic firms. I also carry out a number of further 
robustness checks. I investigate alternative timing, alternative measures of investment in low-
wage economies, and check robustness against a range of indicators of industry skill-intensity. 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Overseas investment 
I use information on overseas investment from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) to identify UK multinational firms and 
to derive indicators of whether or not they own affiliates in low-wage economies. The AFDI 
register contains annual information on the population of firms undertaking outward investment 
                                                 
11 Strictly, identification may also come through plants changing ownership, for example being taken over by a UK-
MNE investing in a low-wage economy. 
12 The approach can also be characterised in the terminology of the treatment effects literature, where the 
‘treatment’ is investment in China. Treatment is endogenous and can be thought of as a function of a latent variable, 
the difference in future profits from investing in China versus not doing so. I therefore use an instrument, a 
reduction in the fixed costs of investing in China, that directly affects a firm’s treatment status (asymmetrically 
depending on firm characteristics), but which only affects the outcome of interest, plant exit, via the treatment. 
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from the UK and on the country of location of their overseas subsidiaries, associates and 
branches.13 I use the register data over the period 1998 to 2003.  
I use these data to identify where UK-MNEs have investments, and by combining this with data 
on those countries’ GDP per capita relative to that in the UK I create firm-level indicators for 
investment in low-wage economies. I use two main indicators. The first is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a firm has overseas operations in any country with per capita GDP of less than 
10% of that in the UK in a particular year. However in doing this I exclude overseas operations 
in countries designated as tax havens. This is because the register is used for the purpose of 
collecting FDI data which relate to all financial flows to overseas affiliates, rather than just those 
relating to investment in fixed capital assets. These, along with the countries with per capita 
GDP less than 10% of the UK where I observe overseas affiliates, are listed in table A1 in the 
Appendix. The second indicator I use is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has overseas 
operations in China in a particular year. 
3.2 Exit and organisational structure 
My second data source is the plant population data from the British Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD).14 The main analysis is carried out using information for the population of 
manufacturing plants for 1998 to 2004, on employment, age, 5-digit industry, ownership and 
firm structure. The AFDI information can be linked to the ARD data at the firm level.15  
I define a plant as exiting in year t if t is the final year it is observed in the population. Exit is 
defined as closure; if instead a plant were taken over, and not closed, it would remain in the 
                                                 
13 No information on the size of the affiliate is provided. A subsidiary is an overseas company where the UK parent 
holds the majority of the voting rights and can exercise a dominant influence, an overseas associate company is one 
where the UK parent holds at least 10% of the voting rights and can exercise a significant influence, and a branch is 
a permanent overseas establishment defined for the purpose of UK tax and double taxation agreements. This is a 
fixed place of business abroad through which the UK company operates but which is not a subsidiary or associate 
company. Affiliates of foreign-owned firms located in the UK are also observed to make outward investments from 
the UK. These remain classified as foreign-owned. The population of firms in the register increases over the period. 
Part of this may be due to the inclusion of outward investors that were previously missing from the register. This 
may mean I mis-classify some UK-MNEs as domestic firms, but this should only act to make it harder to identify 
differences in behaviour between the different firm types. 
14 See Barnes and Martin (2002) and Griffith (1999) for a full description. It is a legal requirement for firms to 
respond to the ARD survey. The ARD contains indicators of whether a UK-based plant is owned by a foreign 
multinational. This information is collected alongside the outward AFDI investment data. The definition of FDI 
used for statistical purposes in collecting the inward and outward FDI data is, “investment that adds to, deducts 
from or acquires a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the 
investor’s purpose being to have an “effective voice” in the management of the enterprise. (For the purposes of the 
statistical inquiry, an effective voice is taken as equivalent to a holding of 10% or more in the foreign enterprise.).” 
Office for National Statistics (2000). 
15 See Criscuolo and Martin (2003) and Griffith et al. (2004) for analyses using these linked data. 
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population the following year. In estimation I pool six annual cross sections of data covering the 
period 1998-2003, and a plant is classified as an exitor if it exits in year t. This provides a close 
link between the observed characteristics in year t and the exit decision. As robustness checks I 
also measure exit over two year periods and over a single six year period. 
I use the plant population data to construct characteristics following other studies of plant exit, 
including age and size (log employment), (see Dunne et al., 1988, 1989 and Disney et al., 
2003b). Bernard and Jensen (2007) emphasise the importance of controlling for firm structure 
variables. I construct three indicators of multi-plant firms: whether a plant is part of a firm with 
other plants in the same 5-digit manufacturing industry (multi_ind); whether the plant is part of a 
firm with plants in other 5-digit manufacturing industries (multi_man); and, whether the firm is 
also active in the business services sector (multi_bus). All refer only to activity in the UK. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive. A plant belonging to a firm with all three of these 
characteristics can have values of one for all three of the dummy variables. 
3.3 Firm characteristics and productivity 
To obtain firm-level characteristics for use in the first stage of the IV estimation I use the plant-
level data described above to derive indicators for multi-plant firms and measures of average 
plant size and age by firm-year, and to identify the modal 2-digit industry and region in which 
the firm has UK operations. I obtain measures of productivity and capital intensity from a 
second dataset, the ARD establishment-level sample. Each year detailed information on outputs 
and inputs is collected for a sample of establishments, where an establishment comprises one or 
more plants in the same line of business owned by the same firm. Because this information is 
only available for a sample this restricts the set of firms on which estimation can be carried 
out.16 For each sampled establishment I calculate capital intensity as log capital stock per 
employee, and total factor productivity (TFP) using a Cobb-Douglas index measure.17 I then 
take the average of each of these variables by firm and year. 
                                                 
16 The sample is a census of establishments with 250+ employees, a 50% or 100% sample of establishments with 
between 100 and 249 employees where the fraction varies by industry, a 50% sample of establishments with 10 to 
99 employees and a 25% sample of establishments with fewer than 10 employees. This means that the firm-level 
estimation sample will be orientated towards larger firms. However as shown in table 1 this is likely to cover most 
multinationals, including those investing in China, which are typically large multi-plant firms. 
17 Capital stock information not collected directly. It is constructed using the perpetual inventory method from 
establishment-level data on investment expenditure for three classes of assets, plant and machinery, vehicles and 
buildings. See Martin (2002) for details. 
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As a robustness check on the plant exit results I also use the establishment-level data to estimate 
the final stage of the IV procedure. I construct information on establishment exit and 
organisational structure from basic data on the population of establishments that is comparable 
to the information on the population of plants and combine this with the information on capital 
intensity and total factor productivity for the sampled establishments. Estimating on the 
establishment sample allows me to control for TFP in determining exit (Bernard and Jensen, 
2007), but the establishment sample is less satisfactory in capturing exit accurately. This is for 
two reasons. First, because establishments can comprise more than one plant, exit of individual 
plants can be understated for multi-plant establishments.18 Second, the way the sample is 
structured means that the probability of being sampled increases with establishment size, and 
hence the sample may be biased towards growing, surviving plants. I use sampling weights in 
estimation to try and correct for this. 
3.4 Industry characteristics 
I derive my main measure of industry skill intensity from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). I 
use a measure of the proportion of employees in an industry who report having no 
qualifications.19 I create a time-invariant average at the 4-digit industry level using data from 
1995 to 2003.20 The average share of employees with no qualifications is shown for 2-digit 
industries in table A2 in the Appendix. The sectors with the lowest skill-intensities include 
clothing, leather, textiles and rubber and plastics. 
I create a range of other measures to check robustness. First, an alternative measure from the 
LFS, the proportion of employees in an industry who are qualified to degree level equivalent 
and above. Second, three measures derived from the ARD establishment-level sample. These are 
the share of the total wage bill that is accounted for by skilled workers (administrative, technical 
and clerical workers) as opposed to unskilled workers (operatives), a measure of capital stock 
per worker, and the average annual wage. I construct these at the 5-digit industry level, using 
                                                 
18 This is potentially problematic given that establishments that are part of multinationals are more likely to 
comprise more than one plant. 
19 The LFS asks individuals for their highest qualification. Individuals are then classified into 7 groups: degree or 
equivalent; higher education; GCE A-level or equivalent (an advanced school leaving qualification); GCSE A*-C 
or equivalent (basic school leaving qualification); other qualifications; no qualifications; and don’t know. 
Individuals with no qualifications will therefore have typically left school with no qualifications and obtained no 
formal vocational qualifications since. 
20 I average over the LFS spring quarters for these years to increase the sample sizes on which the measure is based. 
Although it is an industry-level measure there is a concern that it will be affected by firm behaviour (exit) during 
this period. In my robustness checks I use other measures constructed using data which pre-date the analysis period. 
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appropriate sampling weights, for the year 1995.21 The wage bill share of skilled workers 
mirrors the measure used in Head and Ries (2002). Finally I use an alternative measure of 
wages. The average hourly wage at the 4-digit level derived from the UK Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) for 1997. 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the population of plants used in the main analysis. The 
data are averaged over the years 1998-2003. In columns (1)-(4) characteristics are shown for 
plants owned by four different types of firm: domestic only, foreign-owned multinationals, UK-
owned multinationals that are not investing in low-wage economies, and UK-owned 
multinationals investing in low-wage economies (defined as those with per capita GDP less than 
10% of the UK). Column (5) shows characteristics for the subset of low-wage country investors 
that are investing in China. 
The first characteristic is the proportion of plants that exit in a year. On average this is very 
similar across plants of different ownership types at 12-14%.22, 23 The table also shows that 
domestic plants are on average younger and much smaller than those owned by multinationals. 
As expected they are also much less likely to be part of multi-plant firms. The final two rows 
provide information on the distribution of plants across industries of differing skill-intensity 
owned by the different types of firm. The penultimate row shows the average plant skill-
intensity. Skill-intensity is measured as 1 minus the share of employees with no qualifications, 
and is expressed as a deviation from the mean. Hence the measure is increasing in skill-
intensity. The figures indicate that average skill-intensity is highest for plants owned by UK-
multinationals that are investing in low-wage economies. In the final row I rank 4-digit 
industries by the industry-level skill-intensity measure and split them into thirds. The table 
reports the percentage of plants falling into the low-skill-intensity third of industries and the 
high-skill-intensity third, within each ownership category. UK-multinationals investing in low-
                                                 
21 These measures pre-date the main estimation period. 1995 is the last year for which the wage bill information is 
split by administrative, technical and clerical workers and operatives. 
22 For comparison Disney et al. (2003a,b) report an exit rate using the establishment-level ARD population data of 
around 20% per annum over the period 1986-1992 for the UK. Bernard and Jensen (2005) report an exit rate of 
around 35% for US manufacturing plants over a 5-year period. 
23 A potential concern is the accuracy with which the ARD population data records true exit. There may be lags 
between true exit and the records being updated. This should not present a problem for analysis. Exit may be 
recorded in a more timely manner for plants that are part of larger firms such as multinationals, but this would only 
create a bias if exit were recorded more or less accurately for plants in particular industries within particular types 
of firms, which is unlikely to be the case. 
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wage economies are the least likely to be operating UK plants in low-skill-intensity 
manufacturing sectors and are the most likely to be operating UK plants in high-skill-intensity 
sectors. This presents a first piece of evidence in line with these firms engaging in vertical FDI. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics plant population by ownership type, 1998-2003 
 Domestic 
 
(1) 
Foreign-MNE 
 
(2) 
Not low wage 
UK-MNE 
(3) 
 Low wage 
UK-MNE 
(4) 
China 
UK-MNE 
(5) 
Observations 978,338 37,953 25,411 14,317 9,309 
% exit t  13% 13% 12% 13% 14% 
Age (years) 6.39 
(4.91) 
9.60 
(7.15) 
9.80 
(7.28) 
10.57 
(7.48) 
10.22 
(7.36) 
Employment 12.73 
(46.94) 
134.98 
(318.18) 
113.65 
(262.16) 
134.84 
(343.84) 
145.53 
(332.07) 
Multi_ind 0.09 
(0.29) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.46) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
Multi_man 0.04 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
Multi_bus 0.04 
(0.19) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.46) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
Industry skill-intensity -0.001 
(0.076) 
0.018 
(0.067) 
0.008 
(0.078) 
0.023 
(0.066) 
0.023 
(0.065) 
% in low-skill / high-skill 
industries 
27% / 36% 24% / 48% 29% / 44% 18% / 64% 19% / 64% 
Note: calculations are averages over plants present in the population at any point 1998-2003. Age is truncated at 23 
years. Industry skill-intensity measure is 1-(share no qualifications), deviation from mean. Unless otherwise stated 
the table shows means with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
4 Results 
I now discuss the estimation results. Table 2 presents results based on the specification in 
equation (11). The table shows coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The first column 
confirms the findings of Bernard and Jensen (2007) for the UK. I find that plants that are part of 
multi-plant firms and plants that are part of multinational firms are more likely to exit than those 
that are single plant firms or part of firms that only operate in the UK. While Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) did not distinguish plants that are affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals, I find some 
evidence to indicate that UK-based affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals are more likely to 
exit than plants owned by UK-MNEs (although this difference is only statistically significant at 
the 10% level). This is perhaps not surprising as multinationals may adjust employment in 
affiliates abroad more readily than in the home country, (see e.g. Görg and Strobl, 2003 and 
Fabbri et al., 2003 for similar findings). In line with other studies I also find that younger plants 
are more likely to exit, as are plants that are smaller in terms of employment. 
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In column (2) I split UK-MNEs into two different types, those investing in low-wage economies 
and those that are not, and interact each of the three ownership dummies with the skill-intensity 
of the industry in which the plant is operating.24 On average I find no statistically significant 
difference between the estimated coefficients for the two types of UK-MNE. I find that, 
compared to other types of multinational firms, the propensity of UK-MNEs investing in low-
wage economies to close plants varies significantly with the skill-intensity of the industry. More 
specifically, UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies have a higher propensity to close 
plants in low-skill intensity industries relative to high-skill intensity industries consistent with 
them engaging in vertical FDI. The coefficient on the interaction term for low-wage UK-MNEs 
(-0.375) is significantly different to that on the interaction term for UK-MNEs not investing in 
low-wage economies (-0.094) and that on the interaction term for foreign-owned MNEs (-0.068) 
at the 5% and 1% level respectively. The marginal effect of -0.375 implies that for a decrease in 
the industry skill-intensity measure (i.e. an increase in the proportion of employees in the 
industry with no qualifications) of 0.1, there is an increase in the propensity to exit for plants 
owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies of nearly 4 percentage points. 
To investigate whether it is a higher propensity to exit in the lowest-skill industries that is 
driving this finding, figure 2 shows the average predicted probability of exit across plants owned 
by the two types of UK-MNE by 4-digit industry skill-intensity using the estimation results from 
column (2). For ease of exposition it also plots a linear prediction through these points for each 
ownership type. The figure shows that for UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies (right 
panel) the predicted exit probability is significantly higher in less skill-intensive sectors (i.e. 
those with a higher share of employees with no qualifications). 
                                                 
24 I do not include the skill-intensity measure directly in this specification as it varies only at the 4-digit industry 
level as do the industry dummies. The results are very similar using 3-digit industry dummies plus the industry 
skill-intensity measure.  
 20
Table 2. Plant exit and investment in low-wage economies 
Dependent variable=1 if 
exit in t 
All plants 
OLS 
(1) 
All plants
OLS
 (2) 
UK-MNEs 
OLS 
 (3) 
UK-MNEs 
PROBIT 
 (4) 
UK-MNEs 
Firm FE 
(5) 
UK-MNEs 
Firm FE 
(6) 
Agept  
-0.006   
(0.0001) 
-0.006   
(0.0001) 
-0.004 
(0.0003) 
-0.005 
 (-14.57) 
-0.003   
(0.0003) 
-0.003 
 (0.0003) 
Ln(empment)pt 
-0.017   
(0.0004) 
-0.017   
(0.0004) 
-0.021 
(0.003) 
-0.020 
(-8.80) 
-0.032   
(0.004) 
-0.033 
(0.003) 
Multi_indpt 
0.028 
(0.002) 
0.028 
(0.002) 
0.035 
(0.011) 
0.036 
(3.66) 
0.095 
(0.021) 
0.094 
(0.021) 
Multi_manit 
0.020 
(0.002) 
0.020 
(0.002) 
0.025 
(0.009) 
0.031 
(3.13) 
0.079 
(0.021) 
0.079 
(3.77) 
Multi_busit 
0.028 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.004) 
-0.0003 
(0.010) 
-0.0004  
(-0.04) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
Foreign-ownedit 
0.020 
   (0.004) 
0.020 
(0.004) 
    
UK-MNEit 
0.009 
(0.006) 
     
Low wage UK-MNEit  
 0.021 
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.008) 
0.022 
(2.99) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
 
Not low wage UK-MNEit  
 0.007 
(0.006) 
    
Foreign-ownedit * Ind skill-
intensityj 
 -0.068 
(0.048) 
    
Low wage UK-MNEit * Ind 
skill-intensityj 
 -0.375 
(0.102) 
-0.284 
(0.121) 
-0.218   
(-2.31) 
-0.152 
(0.139) 
 
Not low wage UK-MNEit * 
Ind skill-intensityj 
 -0.094 
(0.053) 
    
Ind skill-intensityj 
  0.0005 
(0.080) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
0.010 
(0.077) 
 
Low wage UK-MNEit * Low 
skillj 
     0.043 
(0.020) 
Low wage UK-MNEit * 
Medium skillj 
     0.006 
(0.016) 
Low wage UK-MNEit * High 
skillj 
     0.014 
(0.013) 
Low skillj 
     0.017 
(0.013)   
Medium skillj 
     0.022 
(0.011) 
4-digit industry dummies Yes Yes No No No No 
2-digit industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 - 0.14 0.14 
Obs 1,056,019 1,056,019 39,728 39,728 39,636 39,636 
Note: Estimation is on six annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses in columns (1)-(3), (5) and (6) and marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses in column (4). Standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with GDP per capita less 
than 10% of the UK.  Fixed effects for 1,715 firms columns (5) and (6). 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of exit by industry skill-intensity and firm ownership type 
 
Note: Industry skill-intensity measure is 1-(share no qualifications), deviation from mean. Predicted exit 
probabilities are averages derived from column (2) of table 2. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
 
Columns (3)-(6) of table 2 estimate only on the sub-sample of plants owned by UK-MNEs and 
hence use only those UK-MNEs not operating in low-wage economies as the control group. 
Using this set of firms there is no longer sufficient variation to identify the coefficient on the 
multi_bus indicator, which varies only across firms and time, since the vast majority of these 
firms also own plants classified to the business services sector, (see table 1), which includes 
financial management, accountancy and legal activities. In column (3) I estimate a linear 
probability model and in column (4) I check robustness to estimating a probit model of exit. In 
both cases the negative and significant marginal effect on the interaction term between UK-
MNEs investing in low-wage locations and industry skill-intensity implies that, relative to other 
UK-MNEs, the propensity to close plants by UK-MNEs that are investing in low-wage 
economies is higher, the lower the skill intensity of the industry. 
In columns (5) and (6) I include firm fixed effects.25 Identification of the relationship between 
investment in a low-wage economy and plant exit therefore comes from time series variation 
within firms in their outward investment behaviour. The results in column (5) can be compared 
                                                 
25 The number of observations used in estimation decreases slightly as I only estimate on firms with at least two 
plant observations. 
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with those in column (3). When identification is based on firms that switch into or out of 
investment in low-wage economies the coefficient on the low-wage UK-MNE dummy decreases 
slightly in size and statistical significance. The coefficient on the interaction term decreases to a 
greater extent in size and significance indicating a considerably less strong, but still negative, 
relationship between industry-skill intensity and plant exit. This indicates that the propensity for 
low-wage country investors to shut down plants in low-skill compared to high-skill industries is 
to some degree by other firm-specific factors. To investigate the relationship further in column 
(6) I use a more flexible specification and replace the continuous measure of skill-intensity in 
the interaction term with three dummy variables for the third of the distribution of industry skill-
intensities in which a plant lies, Low skillj (lowest skill-intensity third), Medium skillj (middle 
third), and High skillj (highest third). This specification also ensures that previous results are not 
driven by outlying values of the continuous measure of skill-intensity. Again identification 
comes from within-firm changes in outward investment strategy. Using this specification I do 
find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for a UK-MNE 
investing in a low-wage economy and the Low skillj indicator, that is, it is in the lowest-skill 
industries that plants owned by UK-MNEs that switch into investing in low-wage economies are 
significantly more likely to exit. The results show no significant difference in the propensity to 
exit across plants owned by the two types of UK-MNEs in the other two thirds of the industry 
skill distribution.  
The results suggest that UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies are behaving in a manner 
consistent with vertical FDI, and more specifically are decreasing UK activity in the lowest-skill 
sectors in line with the theoretical predictions of these models. The results in column (6) imply 
that plants in the lowest-skill industries, for example in textiles and clothing, that are owned by 
UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies, are around 4 percentage points more likely to 
close than those owned by UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-wage economies.  
The specifications in table 2 incorporate only a very short time lapse between firms’ decisions to 
invest in low-wage economies and to close UK plants. In table A3 in the Appendix I experiment 
with longer time frames on the basis that adjustment may only occur with a lag. Columns (1) 
and (3) of table A3 re-estimate the specification from column (2) of table 2 using different 
definitions of exit (defined over a two year period, and defined over a six year period). The 
results are in line with the main findings, although in column (3) using the six-year exit period 
the coefficient on the interaction term between industry skill-intensity and the indicator for UK-
MNEs not investing in low-wage economies is also negative and significant albeit of a smaller 
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magnitude than that on the interaction term for UK-MNEs that are investing in low-wage 
economies. This may be explained by some UK-MNEs switching into investing in low-wage 
economies over the period, whereas I categorise them on the basis of their investment status in 
the first year, 1998. I now present a series of further exercises to check the robustness of my 
results and present the results of the IV estimation. 
4.1 Alternative definitions of investment in low-wage economies 
Table 3 shows results using alternative definitions of low-wage economies. Columns (1) and (2) 
use definitions of a low-wage economy as one with GDP per capita of less than 5% and less 
than 25% of UK per capita GDP respectively. The results are very similar to those in column (2) 
of table 2, with a lower estimated marginal effect using the less than 25% of UK per capita GDP 
definition which includes a larger group of low-wage countries. 
Column (3) uses specific groups of countries from the outward FDI data. I use three groups: 
South and East Asia (including China and India), Eastern Europe and Africa. Estimation is thus 
relative to all other types of firms (UK-MNEs undertaking outward investment to all other 
economies, domestic firms and affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals). Comparing the three 
interaction terms the strongest and most statistically significant negative relationship between 
plant exit and industry skill intensity is for plants owned by firms investing South and East Asia. 
In the final column I separate out only those firms investing in China, hence the comparison 
group is plants owned by all other types of firms. Relative to other plants, I find a significant 
negative relationship between the likelihood of exit and industry skill-intensity for plants owned 
by firms investing in China. A decrease in industry skill-intensity of 0.1 is associated with a 3 
percentage point increase in the probability of exit. This finding is supported in table A3 in the 
Appendix (columns (2) and (4)) using definitions of exit over longer time periods. Having 
confirmed that the same basic relationship holds using a measure of investment in China, in the 
next section I present the IV estimation results which exploit Chinese WTO accession. 
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Table 3. Alternative definitions of investment into low-wage economies 
Dependent variable=1 if exit in t All plants 
(< 5% UK 
GDP per capita) 
(1) 
All plants 
(< 25% UK 
GDP per capita) 
(2) 
All plants 
(Country 
groups) 
(3) 
All plants 
(China) 
 
(4) 
Low wage UK-MNEit 
0.016   
(0.010)   
0.016   
(0.008)  
 
Not low wage UK-MNEit 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.056)  
 
Low wage UK-MNEit * Ind skill-
intensityj 
-0.343 
(0.104) 
-0.263 
(0.076)  
 
Not low wage UK-MNEit * Ind skill-
intensityj 
-0.106 
(0.052) 
-0.117   
(0.057)  
 
Eastern Europeit 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
 
Africait 
 
 
0.028 
(0.010) 
 
South and East Asiait 
 
 
0.006 
(0.011) 
 
Eastern Europeit * Ind skill-intensityj 
 
 
-0.085 
(0.096) 
 
Africait * Ind skill-intensityj 
 
 
-0.162 
(0.117) 
 
South and East Asiait * Ind skill-
intensityj 
  -0.197 (0.128) 
 
Chinait    
0.019 
(0.012) 
Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj    
-0.319 
(0.119) 
Controls: Foreign-ownedit, Foreign-
ownedit * Ind skill intensityj 
Yes Yes No No 
Controls: Agept, Ln(empment)pt, 
Multi_indpt, Multi_manit, Multi_busit 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Obs 1,056,019 1,056,019 1,056,019 1,056,019 
Notes Estimation is on six annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. Columns (1), (2) low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with GDP 
per capita less than 5%, 25% of the UK respectively. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
4.2 Investment in China: IV results  
I begin by presenting the results of the first stage of the IV estimation as given by equation (12). 
Estimation is carried out using data aggregated to the firm level, and on the set of firms for 
which information on TFP and capital intensity can be derived from the establishment level 
sample (see section 3.3). The first stage equation for investment in China is estimated as a 
probit, and table 4 shows marginal effects and z-statistics in parentheses. Column (1) shows that 
firms that invest in China are typically larger both in terms of employment and the likelihood of 
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being multi-plant firms. They are more capital intensive and there is some evidence that they 
have higher TFP, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. Firms 
investing in China are also more likely to be investing elsewhere in South and East Asia.  
Table 4. Investment in China 
Dependent variable=1 if invest in China in t PROBIT (1) 
PROBIT 
(2) 
PROBIT 
(3) 
PROBIT 
(4) 
Ageit 
0.00046   
(0.86) 
0.0004   
(0.78) 
0.00033 
(0.73) 
0.00153 
(2.29) 
Ln(empment)it 
0.00012   
(3.02) 
0.00012   
(3.04) 
0.00013 
(3.54) 
0.00014 
(2.29) 
Multi_indit 
0.0005 
(3.07) 
0.00049 
(3.10) 
0.00043  
(3.08) 
0.00012 
(1.44) 
Multi_manit 
0.001 
(4.71) 
0.00099 
(4.75) 
0.0009 
(4.86) 
0.00018 
(1.45) 
Multi_busit 
0.00061 
(3.60) 
0.00058 
(3.57) 
0.0005 
(3.61) 
-0.00006 
(1.37) 
Ln(TFP)it 
0.00012 
   (1.22) 
0.00009 
(0.97) 
0.00012 
(1.28) 
0.00003 
(0.48) 
Ln(K/L)it 
0.00019 
(3.88) 
0.00017 
(3.30) 
0.00019 
(3.87) 
0.00005 
(0.99) 
Average Ind skill-intensityit  
-0.00021 
(0.44) 
-0.0003 
(0.63) 
-0.00021 
(0.50) 
-0.00106 
(1.04) 
Other South or East Asiait  
0.0529 
(15.08) 
0.052 
(15.03) 
0.04156 
(13.34) 
0.03197 
(12.92) 
WTOt 
 0.00017 
(2.83) 
0.01657 
(2.74) 
0.00970 
(2.42) 
WTOt * Other South or East Asiait 
  0.00021 
(1.63) 
0.00023 
(2.02) 
WTOt * Ln(empment)it 
  -0.00008 
(2.26) 
-0.00006 
(2.13) 
WTOt * Ln(TFP)it 
  -0.00011 
(1.06) 
-0.00009 
(1.03) 
WTOt * Ln(K/L)it 
  -0.00013 
(2.20) 
-0.00008 
(1.98) 
Firm-level averages of: Age, Ln(empment),  
Multi_ind,  Multi_man, Multi_bus, Ln(TFP), 
Ln(K/L), Average Ind skill-intensity 
No No No Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.580 0.582 0.584 0.593 
LL -696.27 -692.96 -688.68 -673.77 
F-statistic WTOt and interaction terms   20.20 17.10 
Obs 32,890 32,890 32,890 32,890 
Notes Estimation is on six annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows marginal effects and z-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. WTOt takes the value 1 in the years 2002 and 2003. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
During the period 1998-2001 the proportion of firms in the estimation sample investing in China 
is 0.7%, rising to 1.2% in the years 2002-2003 post WTO accession. In column (2) I include a 
dummy variable equal to one in the years post Chinese WTO accession. As expected this is 
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positive and significant. To generate firm-time variation in the instrument I interact the post-
WTO dummy with a set of firm characteristics expected to be related to the likelihood that firms 
invest in China in the post-WTO accession period. The characteristics I use are an indicator of 
whether the firm is investing in other South and East Asian economies and measures of size 
(employment), TFP and capital intensity. The marginal effects on the interaction terms imply 
that the set of firms investing in China in the post-WTO accession period are more likely to be 
investing in other South and East Asian economies, but are on average smaller, less capital 
intensive and have lower TFP compared to the set of firms investing in China in the pre-WTO 
period, (although are still larger and more capital intensive than those firms that never invest in 
China). This fits with the prediction of the model presented in section 2.1, which implies that 
following a reduction in the fixed cost of investment abroad, the average productivity of the set 
of firms that find it profitable to produce abroad will be lower compared to the period before the 
reduction in the fixed cost of investment. An F-test of the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments (the post-WTO dummy variable and the interaction terms) shows that these 
variables have power in determining investment in China (F-statistic 20.20). 
The inclusion of firm fixed effects in a probit model is problematic due to bias introduced 
through the incidental parameters problem. Instead, in column (4) I include non-time-varying 
firm-level averages of the characteristics variables (Wooldridge, 2002, section 15.8.2). This 
reduces the joint significance of the excluded instruments slightly (F-statistic 17.10). I check the 
robustness of the final stage results to using this alternative first stage specification. 
Table 5 shows the final stage results. First, column (1) replicates the OLS results from column 
(4) of table 3 on the smaller set of plants for which the first stage of the IV estimation can be 
carried out (since I go on to include firm fixed effects I also replace the 4-digit industry 
dummies with 2-digit industry dummies plus the 4-digit level measure of industry skill-
intensity). The results are very similar to those on the full population of plants in table 3. 
Column (2) adds firm fixed effects, hence identification of the main coefficients of interest now 
comes through within-firm time-series variation in investment in China. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable for investment in China decreases substantially and is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. The coefficient on the interaction term between industry skill-
intensity and investment in China remains of a similar magnitude but is now only significant at 
the 10% level. Taken together these results suggest that although on average investment into 
China is not associated with a higher probability of plant exit, there is still a higher probability 
of exit for plants in low-skill industries relative to high-skill industries compared to that for 
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firms not investing in China. The higher average probability of exit indicated in column (1) of 
around 2 percentage points appears to be due to other firm-specific characteristics. 
Table 5. Plant exit and investment in China 
Dependent variable=1 if 
exit in t 
All plants 
OLS 
 (1) 
All plants 
Firm FE 
(2) 
All plants 
IV, Firm FE 
(3) 
All plants 
IV (col 4 Table 3) 
Firm FE 
(4) 
Agept  
-0.004 
(0.0002) 
-0.003   
(0.0003) 
-0.003 
(0.0003) 
-0.003 
(0.0003) 
Ln(empment)pt 
-0.020 
(0.002) 
-0.037   
(0.003) 
-0.037 
(0.003) 
-0.037 
(0.003) 
Multi_indpt 
0.057 
(0.004) 
0.149 
(0.011) 
0.149 
(0.011) 
0.149 
(0.011) 
Multi_manit 
0.048 
(0.005) 
0.137 
(0.012) 
0.137 
(0.012) 
0.137 
(0.012) 
Multi_busit 
0.015 
(0.005) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
Chinait 
0.024 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.042) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj 
-0.353 
(0.140) 
-0.303 
(0.177) 
-0.344 
(0.255) 
-0.305 
(0.258) 
Ind skill-intensityj 
0.047 
(0.041) 
0.026 
(0.056) 
0.031 
(0.060) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.20 - - 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic    12322.23 13316.76 
Partial R2: (1); (2)   0.24; 0.38 0.25; 0.38 
Obs 88,923 88,923 88,923 88,923 
Note: Estimation is on six annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. Fixed effects for 8,861 firms columns (2), (3) and (4). Instruments in columns (3) 
and (4) are  and * Ind skill-intensityj where  is the predicted probability of investment in China from 
column (3) and column (4) of table 4 respectively. Partial R2s (1), (2) are for the instruments in the first stage 
regressions for the endogenous variables Chinait and Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj respectively. Cragg-Donald F-
statistic provides a measure of the power of the instruments in these first stage regressions. 
itCˆ itCˆ itCˆ
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
 
Column (3) shows the final stage IV results. I instrument two variables, the dummy variable for 
investment in China and the interaction term between industry skill intensity and investment in 
China using two instruments - the predicted probability of investment in China from column (3) 
of table 4 and the interaction between the predicted probability of investment in China and 
industry skill intensity. Hence the equation is exactly identified. The other right hand side 
variables from column (1) of table 5 are also included in the instrument set. The F-statistic and 
partial Rs indicate no problems with weak instruments, but this is to be expected since the 
dummy variable for investment in China is being instrumented with the predicted probability of 
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investment in China obtained from table 4, (the F-statistics reported in table 4 demonstrate the 
power of the assumed exogenous variables). 
Compared to column (2), in column (3) of table 5 the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on 
the two instrumented terms remains similar, but both are less precisely estimated. This loss of 
precision might be expected given the collinearity between the right hand side variables 
introduced through the IV procedure. In column (4) I use the specification in column (4) of table 
4 to generate the predicted probability of investment in China. The results are similar to those in 
column (3). In general, the impact of the IV procedure compared to the fixed effects results in 
column (2) is to raise slightly the average probability of exit of plants owned by firms investing 
in China, although this remains statistically insignificant. 
As a further check I also use the establishment-level sample (see section 3.3) to estimate the exit 
equation. This enables me to include measures of capital intensity and TFP in line with Bernard 
and Jensen (2007). These data have some problems in that they will understate exit by multi-
plant establishments, and the sample will likely be biased towards large, surviving 
establishments. To try to deal with this second issue I weight observations by the inverse of their 
sampling probabilities. Table A4 in the Appendix shows the results. Column (1) repeats the 
specification in column (1) of table 5. The results are very similar, although the coefficient on 
the interaction term between industry skill-intensity and investment in China is only significant 
at the 10% level. In column (2) I add in the measures of capital intensity and TFP. As expected 
establishments with lower TFP and lower capital intensity are more likely to close. However, 
the main coefficients of interest are un-affected by the inclusion of these variables. Given the 
small number of observations for each firm in this sample I do not include firm fixed effects, but 
in column (3) of table A4 I report the results of the IV estimation without firm fixed effects. 
Again the coefficient on the dummy variable for investment in China increases relative to the 
OLS results in column (2), suggesting a downward bias in the OLS coefficient, and perhaps that 
more successful firms that are more likely to survive have a higher propensity to invest in China. 
In fact the results in table 5 including firm fixed effects imply that the estimated higher average 
exit propensity can be explained by unobservable firm characteristics. The estimated coefficient 
on the interaction term remains negative but decreases in magnitude and statistical significance. 
4.3 Alternative measures of industry skill intensity 
Finally, table 6 checks the robustness of the results in table 5 against alternative definitions of 
industry skill intensity. Columns (1), (2) and (3) use 5-digit industry level measures constructed 
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from the ARD establishment-level sample: capital intensity (capital stock per employee); the 
skilled worker share of the wage bill; and the average annual wage. Column (4) uses an 
alternative 4-digit industry wage measure, the hourly wage as measured in the ASHE. The final 
column uses a further 4-digit industry level measure derived from the LFS, the share of 
employees reporting having degree level or equivalent or above qualifications. I express each 
measure as a deviation from the sample mean, and each measure would be expected to be 
increasing in the skill-intensity of the industry. All columns are IV specifications and include 
firm fixed effects. 
Table 6. Alternative definitions of low-skill, low-wage industries, firm fixed effects, IV  
Dependent variable=1 if exit in t Capital 
intensity 
(ARD) 
(1) 
Skilled workers 
wagebill share 
(ARD) 
(2) 
Mean annual 
wage  
(ARD) 
(3) 
Mean 
hourly pay  
(ASHE)  
(4) 
Share 
degree 
(LFS) 
(5) 
Chinait 
-0.002   
(0.039) 
-0.011   
(0.040) 
-0.014   
(0.041) 
-0.017   
(0.042) 
-0.026   
(0.041) 
Chinait * Industry characteristicj  
-0.016   
(0.010) 
-0.274   
(0.111) 
-0.049   
(0.337) 
-0.004   
(0.011) 
-0.328  
(0.198) 
Industry characteristicj 
-0.001   
(0.002) 
-0.101   
(0.034) 
0.134   
(0.134) 
-0.002   
(0.003) 
0.004   
(0.041) 
Controls: Agept, Ln(empment)pt, 
Multi_indpt, Multi_manit, Multi_busit 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 88,923 88,923 88,923 88,923 88,923 
Notes: all industry characteristics are expressed as deviations from the sample mean. Standard deviations are: 
capital intensity 1.34 (underlying variable £100,000s capital stock per employee, 1995); skilled workers wagebill 
share 0.17 (ATC share of total wagebill, 1995); mean annual wage 0.04 (£100,000 per year, 1995); mean hourly 
pay 1.70 (£1997); share degree 0.10 (share employees with degree level or above qualification). ARD industry 
characteristics vary at the 5-digit industry level, LFS and ASHE characteristics at the 4-digit level. Estimation is on 
6 annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parentheses. All columns show IV estimates with firm fixed effects for 8,861 firms. Instruments are  and * 
Industry characteristicj where  is the predicted probability of investment in China from column (3) of table 4.  
itCˆ itCˆ
itCˆ
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population, establishment sample and AFDI data (source: ONS), the 
LFS and the ASHE. 
In all cases the estimated average impact of investment in China on plant exit is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are all 
negative, but are only statistically significant at the 10% level in two cases. These are for the 
skilled workers’ wage bill share and the share of employees with degree or above qualifications. 
The first of these is equivalent to the main variable used to measure the skill-intensity of 
production in Head and Ries (2002). The results imply that a decrease in the skilled workers’ 
wage bill share of one standard deviation (0.17) is associated with an increase in the propensity 
to exit of around 5 percentage points for plants owned by firms investing in China, over and 
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above that for other plants. The second measure implies that for plants owned by firms investing 
in China a decrease in the proportion of employees with degree of above level skills of 0.10 (or 
one standard deviation) is associated with around a 3 percentage point increase in the probability 
of exit. The interaction using the measure of capital intensity is only significant at the 15% level. 
This should provide an inverse measure of the labour intensity of production. The estimated 
coefficient implies that a one standard deviation (1.34) decrease in capital intensity (or increase 
in labour intensity) is associated with around a 2 percentage point increase in the probability of 
plant exit. The coefficients on the interaction terms using the two measures of wages are not 
statistically significant, but it is possible that these measures, which will be affected by a range 
of factors, provide less precise measures of industry skill- or labour-intensity. 
4.4 Discussion 
The findings imply asymmetric effects of investment in low-wage economies for workers in 
industries of differing skill-intensity. The initial results in table 3 suggest potential adverse 
effects for workers in low-skill industries employed in plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in 
low-wage economies, but imply no difference in exit propensities for plants owned by different 
types of firm in high-skill industries. The fixed effects IV results in table 5 for investment in 
China suggest a slightly different story, but still imply asymmetric effects for low and high-skill 
workers. Since the average effect of investment in China on plant exit is estimated to be around 
zero, the results suggest potential adverse effects for workers in plants in low-skill industries 
owned by firms investing in China, but potential beneficial effects for workers in high-skill 
industries in the same firms, since their plants have lower estimated exit propensities compared 
to plants in the same industries owned by other types of firms. The results in column (3) of table 
5 point towards a worker in a plant in a relatively low-skill industry that is owned by a firm 
investing in China facing around a 1.6 percentage point higher probability of their workplace 
being closed compared to a worker in a plant in the same industry owned by a different type of 
firm. Whereas, a worker in a plant in a relatively high-skill industry owned by a firm investing 
in China has around a 3.2 percentage point lower probability of the plant being closed compared 
to plant in the same industry owned by a different type of firm.26  
Although firms making investments in low-wage economies own a relatively small proportion 
of manufacturing plants in the UK economy, as shown in tables 1 and 7 the size of these plants 
                                                 
26 Low-skill, high-skill industry figures calculated using industry skill-intensity of minus and plus one standard 
deviation (0.07) respectively. Probabilities are: -0.008+(-0.07x-0.344)=0.016, and -0.008+(0.07x-0.344)=-0.032. 
 31
 32
                                                
means that the numbers of workers employed by these firms is somewhat greater. However, the 
overall effects of outward investment into low-wage economies on workers of different skill 
levels and on the income distribution will depend in part on re-employment opportunities for 
displaced workers. One possibility is that low-skill workers facing plant closures are re-
deployed within the same firm – potentially even within surviving plants in the same industry. 
Indeed it is possible that the re-allocation of workers to surviving plants, or to new plants set up 
by the same firms counteract the effects of plant exit. 
To investigate this I present some final descriptive evidence that demonstrates that entry and 
expansion of surviving plants within firms is unlikely to offset the effect of plant exit, and that 
investment in low-wage economies is associated with an increase in the skill-intensity of 
employment at the firm level within firms’ UK operations. In table 7 I take all firms present in 
1998 and split them into four ownership groups (UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies, 
other UK-MNEs, affiliates of foreign-owned MNEs and purely domestic) according to their 
characteristics in that year. The table shows how UK employment in these firms is distributed 
across industries by skill-intensity in 1998 and again, to the extent that they survive, in 2003. 
The final column shows that firms investing in low-wage economies exhibited the sharpest fall 
in employment over the period, a decrease of 47%.27  
All types of firm exhibited the greatest fall in employment in low skill-intensity industries, in 
particular both types of UK-MNE. Both types of UK-MNE shifted employment from low to 
high-skill industries, but those firms investing in low-wage economies did so to a greater extent, 
(this group had a 66% decrease in employment in low-skill industries versus a 37% decrease in 
employment in high-skill industries, where the difference between these two rates exceeds that 
for other UK-MNEs). Moreover, UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies already had a 
much lower share of their employment in low-skill industries in 1998 (23%, compared to 40% 
for other UK-MNEs). By 2003 this had fallen to only 14%, and the share in high-skill industries 
had risen to 66% (compared to 33% and 39% for other UK-MNEs). This overall decrease in 
employment, coupled with the shift towards high-skill industries implies that expansion and new 
plant entry were unlikely to be counteracting the effects of exit on workers in low-skill 
industries within UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies. 
 
 
27 The decrease in employment between 1998 and 2003 for each category is high because the figures are calculated 
for a single cohort of firms present in 1998. They will be counteracted by the entry of new firms and hence do not 
reflect the overall change in manufacturing employment over the period. 
Table 7. Distribution of employment across industries by firm type, 1998 cohort 
 Distribution of employment across industries 
 
 
 
 High skill-intensity Medium skill-intensity Low skill-intensity Total 
 
Firm type Employment 
(thousands) 
% 
change 
 
Employment 
(thousands) 
% 
change 
 
Employment 
(thousands) 
% 
change 
 
Employment 
(thousands) 
%  
change 
 1998 2003  1998 2003  1998 2003  1998 2003  
Domestic 716 427 -40% 729 447 -39% 899 500 -44% 2,344 1,373 -41% 
Foreign-MNE 256 159 -38% 281 168 -40% 136 80 -41% 673 408 -39% 
Low wage UK-MNE  287 181 -37% 115 57 -50% 117 40 -66% 519 276 -47% 
Not low wage UK-MNE 175 127 -27% 145 90 -38% 207 106 -49% 528 323 -39% 
             
Total (thousands) 1,435 893 -38% 1,270 760 -40% 1,359 727 -47% 4,064 2,380 -41% 
Note: figures are calculated for the cohort of manufacturing firms present in 1998. Table shows the distribution of employment across industries in 1998 and 2003 by firm 
ownership type. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper has presented empirical evidence that UK multinationals investing abroad in low-
wage economies are acting in line with the predictions of theories of vertical foreign direct 
investment. To identify the effects of overseas investment I exploit an exogenous policy change 
in the form of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. I adapt the model of Helpman et al. 
(2004) to demonstrate how a policy reform which reduces the fixed cost of inward investment 
might induce some firms to begin investing in China, and how this in turn might have 
asymmetric effects on their high-skill and low-skill activities at home. In my empirical results I 
find that plants in low skill-intensity industries owned by UK multinationals investing in low-
wage economies such as China are more likely to exit than those owned by other firms. My 
findings also suggest potential beneficial effects for workers in home-economy high-skill 
industries employed by firms investing in low-wage economies through an increased likelihood 
of plant survival.   
The findings extend the existing evidence on whether outward investment acts to displace home-
country employment, and the literature on the determinants of multinational plant exit. Given 
increasing geographic mobility of economic activity and the fact that multinational firms make 
up significant proportions of employment in economies such as the US and UK, the results have 
potential implications for the industrial composition of employment in OECD economies. The 
findings suggest that firms investing in low-wage economies are shifting the balance of their 
domestic employment towards high-skill industries at a greater rate than other types of firm, and 
that this is in part driven by plant closures in low-skill industries as workers in low-wage 
economies substitute for workers in low-skill industries at home. From a policy perspective this 
suggests that re-training opportunities for low-skill workers, particularly in general, transferable 
skills, may be important for ensuring that displaced individuals remain attached to the labour 
market and have a better prospect of gaining employment in other industries. Finally, the 
empirical analysis in this paper was restricted to manufacturing, a natural extension would be to 
examine effects of outward FDI on mobile service sector activities. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Low wage countries and tax havens 
Low-wage economies 
Albania Ecuador Jordan Rwanda 
Algeria Egypt Kenya Senegal 
Angola El Salvador Laos Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Sri Lanka 
Benin Ethiopia Malawi Sudan 
Bolivia Ghana Mali Suriname 
Bulgaria Guatemala Morocco Syria 
Burkina Faso Guinea Mozambique Tanzania 
Cameroon Guyana Nicaragua Togo 
Cape Verde Haiti Niger Tonga 
Central African Republic India Nigeria Vietnam 
Chad Indonesia Pakistan Zaire 
China Israel Papua New Guinea Zambia 
Congo Iran Paraguay Zimbabwe 
Djibouti Ivory Coast Philippines  
Dominican Republic Jamaica Romania  
Tax havens 
Antigua Bermuda Isle of Man St Kitts and Nevis 
Bahamas Channel Islands Liechtenstein St Lucia 
Bahrain Cyprus Luxembourg St Vincent 
Barbados Gibraltar Macao 
Belize Grenada Netherlands Antilles 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
 
Table A2. Industry skill-intensity: share of employees with no qualifications 2-digit 
industry average 
2-digit industry Share no qualifications 
15 Food and beverages 0.17 
16 Tobacco 0.15 
17 Textiles 0.30 
18 Clothing 0.41 
19 Leather 0.33 
20 Wood and wood products 0.20 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.19 
22 Publishing and printing 0.10 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products 0.05 
24 Chemicals 0.11 
25 Rubber and plastics 0.23 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.21 
27 Basic metals 0.15 
28 Fabricated metal products 0.18 
29 Machinery and equipment 0.12 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.07 
31 Electrical Machinery 0.17 
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.13 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.11 
34 Motor vehicles 0.16 
35 Other transport equipment 0.12 
36 Furniture, manufacturing not elsewhere classified 0.21 
37 Re-cycling 0.21 
Total 0.18 
Note: average across 4-digit industries within 2-digit industry 
Source: author’s calculations using LFS spring quarters 1995 to 2003. 
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Table A3. Investment in low-wage economies and exit, alternative timing. 
Dependent variable=1 if exit in: t to t+1 
Exit over 2 years 
t to t+5 
Exit over 6 years 
 All plants (1) 
All plants
(2) 
All plants 
 (3) 
All plants 
(4) 
Foreign-ownedit 
0.035   
(0.007) 
 0.044 
(0.015)  
Low wage UK-MNEit  
0.044   
(0.015) 
 0.047   
(0.025)  
Not low wage UK-MNEit  
0.015   
(0.012) 
 0.019 
(0.015)  
Foreign-ownedit * Ind skill-intensityj 
-0.088   
(0.081) 
 0.146 
(0.228)  
Low wage UK-MNEit * Ind skill-intensityj 
-0.506   
(0.166) 
 -0.552   
(0.186)  
Not low wage UK-MNEit * Ind skill-
intensityj 
-0.091   
(0.107) 
 -0.318 
(0.137)  
Chinait  
0.038 
(0.014)  
0.051 
(0.022) 
Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj  
-0.476 
(0.187)  
-0.411 
(0.245) 
Controls: Agept, Ln(empment)pt, 
Multi_indpt, Multi_manit, Multi_busit,    
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Obs 531,355 531,355 181,269 181,269 
Notes: estimation in columns (1) and (2) is on three cross sections 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, estimation in 
columns (3) and (4) is on a single cross section 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors, clustered 
at the firm level, in parentheses. In columns (1) and (3) low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with 
GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
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Table A4. Exit, establishment-level data 
Dependent variable=1 if exit in t 
All plants 
OLS 
 (1) 
All plants 
OLS 
(2) 
All plants 
IV 
(3) 
Agept  
-0.001 
(0.0001)   
-0.001   
(0.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.0001) 
Ln(empment)pt 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.003   
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
Multi_indpt 
0.047 
(0.005) 
0.047 
(0.005) 
0.046 
(0.005) 
Multi_manpt 
0.026 
(0.004) 
0.027 
(0.004) 
0.026 
(0.004) 
Multi_busit 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Ln(TFP) it 
 -0.015 
(0.004) 
-0.015 
(0.004) 
Ln(K/L) it 
 -0.007 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
Chinait 
0.025 
(0.014) 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.046 
(0.020) 
Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj 
-0.344 
(0.190) 
-0.344 
(0.189) 
-0.123 
(0.205) 
Ind skill-intensityj 
0.052 
(0.025) 
0.061 
(0.025) 
0.056 
(0.025) 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 - 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic   11342.00 
Partial R2: (1); (2)   0.36; 0.43 
Obs 39,797 39,797 39,797 
Note: Estimation is on six annual cross sections 1998-2003. Table shows coefficients and standard errors clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. All specifications are weighted using inverse sampling probabilities. Instruments in 
column (3) are  and * Ind skill-intensityj where  is the predicted probability of investment in China from 
column (3) of table 4. Partial R2s (1), (2) are for the instruments in the first stage regressions for the endogenous 
variables Chinait and Chinait * Ind skill-intensityj  respectively. Cragg-Donald F-statistic provides a measure of the 
power of the instruments in these first stage regressions. 
itCˆ itCˆ itCˆ
Source: author’s calculations using ARD establishment sample, establishment population and AFDI data (source: 
ONS) and the LFS. 
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